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Rebuilding EU fish stocks could generate substantial
financial resources for the European economy.
Blog Admin
On 6 February, the European Parliament voted in favour of proposals to reform the EU’s
Common Fisheries Policy. Sebastian Villasante and Rashid Sumaila assess the problem
posed by overfishing in Europe’s waters and outline some of the key areas which need to be
addressed if the Common Fisheries Policy is to achieve its aim of ensuring sustainable
fishing.
Humanity has entered the Anthropocene era, with human activity a major driving f orce
behind many environmental changes on the planet. In this context, marine ecosystems are
key components of  the global system, providing an enormous and diverse array of
environmental goods and services (f ishery resources, tourism, recreational activit ies,
etc.), in addition to helping to regulate the Earth’s climate. Beyond playing a crucial role in
marine ecosystems, f ish support human well-being through employment in f ishing,
processing and retail services, income, f ood consumption, and f ood security. According
to the latest scientif ic research, marine ecosystems are in decline and remain under
pressure f rom f ishing. The ef f ects of  overf ishing have been evident f or many long- lived,
late-reproducing predatory f ish species at higher trophic levels. Many of  the negative ecosystem ef f ects
of  overf ishing only become apparent years or even decades later.
Excess f ishing may generate signif icant
economic losses across the world,
contributing to the decline of  f ish stocks.
One recent study estimates that resource
rent net of  subsidies (the f igure lef t af ter
f ishing costs and subsidies are deducted
f rom revenue) f rom rebuilt world f isheries
could increase f rom the current negative
$13 billion (US) to a posit ive $54 billion per
year, result ing in a net gain of  $600 to
$1,400 billion in present value over f if ty
years af ter rebuilding. According to the
study, the European Union (EU) is the
most af f ected area in the world, with a
potential annual catch loss of  2.8 million
tonnes and a negative resource rent of
$4.8 billion per year.
In the EU, harmf ul subsidies to the f ishing industry and f ishing overcapacity have led to a general decline
of  commercial f ish stocks and loss of  jobs in the f isheries sector. Data f rom the European Commission
indicates that 75 per cent of  EU f ish stocks are overf ished, compared to 25 per cent on average
worldwide. Overf ishing in EU waters damages f ish stocks, leads to uncertain catches, and makes the
f ishing industry f inancially vulnerable. Fragile f ish stocks lead to suboptimal catches and this in turn leads
to more f ishing. For example, the spawning stock biomass of  the North Atlantic cod – one of  the most
important commercial f isheries in the world – declined to its lowest historical level in 2006, with catches
consisting mostly of  immature f ish.
In December 2008 the European Council agreed on a new cod management plan. The plan adopted a new
system of  ef f ort management and a target f ishing mortality rate of  40 per cent. The International Council
f or the Exploration of  the Sea (ICES) points out that although there has been a gradual reduction in
f ishing mortality and discards in recent years, the management plan f or North Sea cod has not controlled
mortality rates as envisaged. To illustrate, Figure 1 shows that landings are, on average, 200 per cent
higher than allocated quotas under the 2008-2012 management plan (F management plan), and 176 per
cent higher during the previous period (2002-2007) prior to the implementation of  the plan.
Figure 1. Fishing effort and overshooting (landings/Total Allowable Catch) from the North Sea
cod long-term management plan
Source: Internat ional Council for the Explorat ion of  the Sea
The sequential depletion of  tradit ional f ish stocks on EU continental shelves has spurred an expansion
of  f isheries towards new f ishing grounds and commercial opportunit ies, creating the so-called “roving
bandits” phenomena in modern f isheries management. The EU f ishing f leet is one of  the most active
distant-water f ishing f leets in the world, expanding its f ishing activity into deeper waters in the North
Atlantic Ocean and elsewhere. The EU f leet has expanded the depth of  its f ishing capacity by an average
of  78 m f or the 1950-2006 period, or almost twice the value (42 m) previously reported f or the global
f leet. This pattern of  expansion towards deep-sea f ishing grounds has not reduced under the Common
Fisheries Policy.
But the expansion is not limited to deep-sea species. The EU f ishing f leet also expanded its
geographical activity towards the rest of  the globe with emphasis on the Southern Hemisphere, in
particular in Af rica and Latin America where f ish stocks (mainly anchovies, sardines, hakes and squids)
are highly important f or f ishing communities, and f ishing activit ies engage several million people due to
the lack of  other alternatives of  employment. While West Af rica is said to be one of  the most diverse,
and economically important, f ishing zones in the world, the Patagonian marine ecosystem also supports
one of  the most productive f ishing grounds. Nevertheless, increased European demand f or seaf ood, the
liberalisation and opening of  the f ishing grounds to f oreign f leets through joint ventures, and the EU
f isheries agreements and the inef f ective control and enf orcement in local f isheries, led to continued
overexploitation of  the main commercial f isheries in these developing regions. In addition, the increase of
illegal f ishing activit ies has had negative ecological and socioeconomic ef f ects. The Eastern Central
Atlantic and the Southwest Atlantic Oceans rank 1st and 2nd worldwide in terms of  total illegal catches,
which implies annual economic benef its lost through illegal f ishing between $205-606 million and $117-
251 million, respectively.
Fish is also one of  the leading export commodities in these regions. In addition to its direct f ood value,
f ish also contributes indirectly to Af rica and Latin America’s f ood self -suf f iciency through trade and
exports to the European Union, Asia and other countries. However, the f isheries in these regions have
been developed under open access regimes, and unauthorised extraction (including recreational f ishing),
making these systems readily accessible f or f ree riders, competit ion and conf licts, especially between
local small-scale and f oreign industrial f ishing f leets. These global and regional patterns are undoubtedly
the result of  a rapid technological development of  f ishing f leets, which has led to an increasing number
of  overexploited and collapsed f ish stocks over t ime, not only in EU waters, but also in the f ishing
grounds of  developing countries. The entire f isheries sector (extractive f ishing, f ish canning and
commercialisation subsectors) is af f ected, with all directly and indirectly employed people suf f ering the
consequences of  the chronic overf ishing problem. Climate change is likely to aggravate existing
production and consumption constraints in countries lacking f ood-security and it is f oreseen that many
people will increasingly be exposed to extreme natural events. More than a billion people worldwide live in
coastal areas, particularly in developing countries, and these areas are much more vulnerable to climate
change.
With most f ishery resources f ully exploited or overexploited in Europe and elsewhere, opportunit ies f or
development lie primarily in restoring depleted stocks and catching f ish more ef f iciently. Fish populations
could strongly increase and generate more economic output if  they were lef t f or only a f ew years under
reduced f ishing pressure. Rather than demanding the highest possible catches immediately, f ishers
would be well advised to demand low increases in catches and a f ixed upper catch below the theoretical
maximum, once the stock is f ully recovered. To realise these benef its, the European Commission needs
to implement a rebuilding programme which would allow EU member States to substantially increase
economic returns by up to $13 billion in just one decade. This would mean that at the end of  the next
Common Fisheries Policy (2013-2022) EU member States would have recovered most f ish stocks, and
the f ishing industry could obtain posit ive resource rents, while maintaining employment and income in
coastal communities.
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